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NOTES
Reinstatement With Back Pay Under the Wagner Act
Section io (c) of the Wagner Act 1 gives the National Labor Rela-
tions Board power to take "such affirmative action, including reinstatement
of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this
1. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ I5I-166 (Supp. x94o).
(648)
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chapter." Board,2 courts,3 and critics 4 dutifully recite this formula in dis-
cussing any order. Few pause to spell out the policies of the Act,5 or how
a given order will effectuate them. After dealing with thousands of labor
disputes, many of which present conflicting interests with which the com-
mon law is wholly inadequate to cope,6 the Board and the courts reviewing
its orders have shaped definite rules controlling reinstatement with or with-
back pay.7 The purpose of this note is to inquire how far those rules do
effectuate the policies of the Act. It will include an analysis of the policies
of the Act and of the effect of the reinstatement order on the parties to the
dispute, followed by a discussion of the rules in the light of the principles
evolved.
1. POLICIES AND PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
Section I, entitled "Findings and declaration of policy", is the ancient
preamble in modem dress. It incorporates in the body of the Act a state-
ment of the "legislative intent", depriving the courts of the opportunity to
construe it to render the statute invalid or ineffectual. Any attempt directly
to interfere with the relations between employer and employee would have
been clearly unconstitutional. Therefore the Act was designed to be effec-
tive under the power to regulate interstate commerce." It recites, in brief,
that the employers' refusal to bargain collectively causes strikes and unrest,
which obstruct commerce by interfering with the flow of goods, raising
prices, and increasing unemployment. 9 The declared policy of Congress
is to eliminate these obstructions by encouraging collective bargaining.1 °
Since Congress has seen fit thus to make known its purpose specifically, it
is important to keep that purpose clearly in mind in examining the results
under the Act.
2. See e. g., Matter of Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, 5 N. L. R. B. 930, 949
(1938).
3. See e. g., Consolidated Edison Co., etc. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 235 (1938).
4. See e. g., Drinker, The Right to Discharge Employees for "Union Activity"
(94o) 88 U. or PA. L. REv. 8o6, 8I5.
5. An extensive analysis of the policy and provision of the Act will be found in
Drinker, note 4 supra pp. 8o6-817. For a good analysis of the effects of a specific or-
der in a specific case see Hart and Prichard, The Fansteel Case: Employee Misconduct
and the Remedial Powers of the National Labor Relations Board (1939) 52 HARv. L.
REv. 1275, 1319.
6. Contempt proceedings against sit-down strikers will not lead to peaceful settle-
ments of labor disputes. For an example see Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. Lodge
66, 295 Ill. App. 323, 14 N. E. (2d) 991 (1938). The failure of such proceedings led to
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § ioi et seq. (Supp.
i94o), prohibiting injunctions in labor disputes.
7. 3 An. Rep. N. L. R. B. (1938) 197.
8. The Act was held constitutional on these grounds, N. L. R. B. v. Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corp., 3oi U. S. 1 (i937). Cf. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act be-
cause its effect on commerce was not sufficiently direct). The legislative ancestor of
the Wagner Act was the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U. S. C.
A. §§ 151-163 (Supp. 1940), which affected.interstate commerce directly. It was upheld
in Texas and N. 0. R. R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and S. S. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (930).
Note (935) 48 HARV. L. REv. 630, discusses the decisions of the Board under the
N. I. R. A.
9. The validity of these premises is evident. The cost of two pitched battles fought
in the sit-down strike in Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. was $6,20o, Hart and Prichard,
note 5 supra, at 1283. For statistics see Drinker, note 4 supra 824, n. 44. The harmful
effect of mere unrest is shown in N. L. R. B. v. Somerset Shoe Co., iii F. (2d) 814
(C. C. A. 5th, 1940), enforcing 9 N. L. R. B. 952 (3938). There disturbed labor con-
ditions forced a gradual shut-down of the plant.
io. The efficacy of the Railway Labor Act in reducing strikes by this means is
pointed out and supported by statistics in Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No.
10, 300 U. S. 515, 553, n. 7 (1937). The N. L. R. B. points with pride to the reduction
of strikes it has accomplished, Summary of Fourth Annual Report of N. L. R. B. 5.
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Section i recognizes the superior bargaining position of the employer.
Section 7 offsets it by guaranteeing to employees certain privileges, which
are, in essence, freedom to form their own unions without domination by
the employer, freedom to bargain through their own representatives, and
freedom to engage in collective activities. Section 8 imposes on employers
corresponding duties, designed to protect those privileges. The breach of
a duty is an "unfair practice". It is "unfair" to interfere with the organ-
ization of a union, and to refuse to bargain collectively. The only unfair
practice which can lead to a reinstatement order is that prohibited in Sec-
tion 8 (3)-"by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage mem-
bership in any labor organization".
The relation of these provisions is important. Very possibly it reflects
the necessity of forcing the Act under the commerce clause. Nevertheless,
there it is, and it should not be ignored. The employer's duties are not an
end in themselves; they are to protect the privileges of the employee. Sim-
ilarly the privileges are set up to facilitate collective bargaining, with the
ultimate purpose of removing obstructions from interstate commerce. Nor-
mally an order directed simply against unfair practices will still serve the
purpose by the chain of cause and effect set forth in the Act. Occasionally
the chain is broken. Then an order designed to discourage an unfair prac-
tice may well result in obstructing commerce more than did the practice
itself. In N. L. R. B. v. Star Publishing Co.11 the truck drivers who dis-
tributed a newspaper belonged to the Teamsters Union affiliated with A. F.
of L. Twenty managers in the circulation department belonged to the
American Newspapers Guild, a member of C. I. 0. The A. F. of L. union
demanded a closed shop in the "circulation department," which included
itself and the twenty managers. Otherwise it would strike. When the
managers refused to change to A. F. of L., the publisher transferred them
to other departments to avoid the threatened strike. The Board 12 found
this a discrimination in hire which discouraged membership in the C. I. 0.
and ordered reinstatement of the managers. The circuit court enforced the
order, mentioning in passing that the result of restoring the status quo
would almost certainly be a strike. The Act, it held, prohibits unfair prac-
tices, regardless of exigencies. Of course, the Act does nothing of the
kind. The court was faced with a struggle between two unions, which
might have been settled without forcing the innocent publisher either to
submit to a strike or be cited for contempt.
2. TimE EFFECT OF SECTION 10 (C)
The commonest order given by the Board is simply to cease and desist
from unfair practices. Section io (e) provides that upon failure to obey,
the Board may petition a circuit court for an enforcing injunction, breach
of which will result in contempt proceedings. That is an efficient pre-
ventive against future infractions; it is not a punishment for the past. It
allows the employer, like the common law dog, the privilege of one bite.
It is conceivable that an employer might intentionally take that bite, if he
thought that he could thereby prevent the organization of a hostile union.13
The only deterrent would be the threat of a reinstatement order with back
ii. 97 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
12. Matter of Star Publishing Co., 4 N. L. R. B. 498, 505 (1937).
13. This possibility is examined in Hart and Prichard, note 5 supra, at 1295 and n.
123. An excellent analysis of the effects of a reinstatement order appears in (1941)
So YALE L. J. 507.
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pay. Such an order is remedial in that it tends to undo the effects of dis-
criminatory firing, and to restore the status quo. It also is a punishment.
No man likes to pay for services he has not received. Therefore, by pun-
ishing past violations and thereby discouraging the one bite allowed by the
other machinery of Section io, the reinstatement order is a proper way to
force the employer to respect the Act.
Its effects on the employee dove-tail nicely. The payment does not
come as a windfall, since during the period of strike or discharge he has
incurred debts which his wages would normally have paid. The order
makes him whole for the damage done by the employer, not, as has been
suggested,' 4 for the damage he has brought on himself by his union activi-
ties. The best justification of reinstatement and pay from the point of
view of effect on the employee is that a failure to grant such an order is a
severe punishment indeed. Not only does it often mean financial hardship.
The result will also be a sort of governmental black-listing. Picture the
chances of a job-seeker whom even the N. L. R. B. wouldn't help. A com-
parison of the effects of granting and not granting the order supports the
Board in its holding that reinstatement with back pay will be awarded in
most instances.' 5 In view of the drastic punishment involved, the employer
should not be able to deprive the employee of this remedy. Only the em-
ployee's own wrongdoing should do that.16
Congress might have prescribed reinstatement with pay for all viola-
tions of Section 8 (3). That would have given the Board a club as large
as the amount of back pay with which to punish the employer. It may have
been the unspoken theory behind orders which do not deduct from back
pay money received by the worker from unemployment insurance or union
benefits. 7 Where the worker obtained work relief under the W. P. A., the
Board punished the employer in similar fashion by forcing him to repay the
W. P. A.'8 The result was supported as a refusal to shift to the govern-
ment agency a risk caused by the employer's violation of the Act. Such an
approach involves the fruitless discussion as to whether or not the W. P. A.
receives a quid pro quo, and if it does, whether it can then be said to be
assuming an unwanted risk. 9 The club theory is a simpler ratio decidendi.
Apparently it was the basis for the dissent in N. L. R. B. v. Republic Steel
Corp.,20 where the majority said that orders to reimburse the W. P. A.
were not within the Board's power to grant and probably not within the
W. P. A.'s power to receive. The size of back pay awards is almost unlim-
ited," and might well bankrupt the firm,22 thus dealing a severe blow to
commerce. Also, reinstatement of employees such as those in Standard
14. (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 1272, 1275.
15. 3 An. Rep. N. L. R. B. (938) 200.
i6. See discussion under § 4, Effect of Employee's Conduct, p. 656 infra.
17. Matter of Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, Inc., 7 N. L. R. B. i86 (1938) (no
deduction for unemployment insurance or union benefits); Matter of Vegetable Oil
Prods. Co., 5 N. L. R. B. 52 (938) (no -deduction for home relief). But cf. N. L.
R. B. v. Greenebaum Tanning Co., iio F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), where re-
spondent company was not required to return to the employees money deducted from
their earnings and paid as dues to a company-dominated union. Such a return was
ordered in Matter of Heller Bros. Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 646 (1938), referred to in 3 An.
Rep. N. L. R. B. ig (1938). See in general (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1265, 1270.
i8. This was the normal order, 3 An. Rep. N. L. R. B. (938) 200, until the recent
case of Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 9 U. S. Law Week 4019 (U. S. 1940), 39
MIcH. L. REv. 328, which allowed the deduction but refused to order it paid to W. P. A.
19. This theory is supported in (1939) 53 HARV. L. REV. 141.
20. 9 U. S. Law Week 4019 (U. S. 1940).
21. Payments in the Carlisle Lumber Co. case may exceed $30o,o0o.
22. Folding Furniture Works, Inc. v. Wis. L. R. B., 232 Wis. 170, 285 N. W. 85i
(1939).
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Lime and Stone Co. v. N. L. R. B.,13 who conspired to blow up the plant,
will scarcely promote peaceful settlements of future disputes. Therefore
the decision not to accept the inflexible "club" standard was a wise one.
24
In practice the Board has taken nearly complete advantage of the
flexibility implied in the words "with or without back pay". Theoretically
the order might be in four forms: first, reinstatement with pay; second,
neither reinstatement nor pay; third, reinstatement without pay; fourth,
pay without reinstatement. The first is the usual order, justified by the
normal effects of the provision. The second works a real hardship on the
employee, and has been properly limited to cases where he has been guilty
of extreme misconduct. 25  The third is a form of compromise which the
N. L. R. B. approaches only by varying the date at which back pay begins.
26
A Wisconsin Labor Relations Board, created under a similar statute, issued
this type of decree where payment of back pay would have bankrupted the
firm.2 7  The fourth is also a compromise, which has generally been dictated
by circumstances, such as where the employee has obtained another job and
does not desire reinstatement.
28
The application of different forms of decree to more complicated situa-
tions, where there are several policies involved, is more difficult. Two prin-
ciples are important. In the first place the effect of any decree is deterrent,
not only against future infractions of the law by the same parties, but also
against infractions by others in similar circumstances. This means that if
both parties are at fault and the decree can penalize only one, it should
penalize the one who is not deterred by the mass of other decrees. Sec-
ondly, any labor dispute involves a struggle consisting of alternate moves
by antagonists. Neither side can predict or be responsible for the next
move of its adversary. It is sometimes suggested that the Act has made it
23. 97 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
24. Cf. Hart and Prichard, note 5 supra at 13io, discussing the analogous flexible
standard of reinstatement. But cf. N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533
(C. C. A. 9th, 1938), rejecting the contention that employees must come before the
court with clean hands, on the basis that the Board is the petitioner. For a case in
which equitable defenses (estoppel and laches) were asserted against the Board see
Matter of Majestic Flour Mills, 15 N. L. R. B. 541 (939).
25. Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), aff'd,
9 U. S. Law Week 4019 (U. S. 1940) (distinguished major from minor offenses) ;
N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 99 F. (2d) 89 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938), enforcing
3 N. L. R. B. 455 (937) (reinstatement refused to striker under indictment for shoot-
ing a member of the company union); Standard Lime and Stone Co. v. N. L. R. B.,
97 F. (2d) 531 (938) (reinstatement refused to strikers who conspired to blow up the
plant). But cf. N. L. R. B. v. Oregon Worsted Co., 96 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938), where the court upheld the Board's refusal to consider evidence of crime com-
mitted a year before the discharge.
A sit-down strike accompanied by violence forfeited reinstatement, N. L. R. B. v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1939) ; McNeely and Price Co. v. N. L.
R. B., io6 F. (2d) 878 (r939). But contra, where the strike was lightly regarded by
local authorities, Matter of Electric Boat Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 572 (1938). Accord:
N. L. R. B. v. Stackpole Carbon Co., O5 F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
26. See notes 69 and 70 infra.
27. Folding Furniture Works, Inc. v. Wis. L. R. B., 232 Wis. 170, 285 N. W. 851
(939).
28. N. L. R. B. v. Highway Trailer Co., 95 F. (2d) IOI2 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938),
enforcing 3 N. L. R. B. 591 (1937) ; Mooresville Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B., 94 F.
(2d) 61 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) ; Matter of Empire Furniture Corp., IO N. L. R. B. 1026
(1939) (cases where employee obtained employment elsewhere); Matter of Williams
Mfg. Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 135 (1938) (employee did not want reinstatement). But she.
N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533, 537 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), cert.
denied, 306 U. S. 646 (1939). For a general discussion see (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1265,
1269.
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possible for the employer to foresee that his unfair practices will lead to a
strike.2 9 It is equally plausible to say that they will lead to a complaint
before the Board. Again in a situation where both parties are at fault, this
means that each must be punished directly. There should be no vicarious
liability.
A hypothetical case somewhat like N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metal-
lurgical Corp.0 will illustrate the importance of both. Suppose the em-
ployer discharges employees unfairly and they begin a violent sitdown
strike. They then petition the Board for reinstatement. The Board wishes
to discourage both the discharges and the sit-down strike. Reinstatement
will deter the former, but will condone the sit-down. Failure to reinstate
punishes the employees, but leaves the employer with only a cease and
desist order against him, better off than he would have been if the men had
not struck. If the Act is taken as notice to the employer that an unfair
practice will lead to a strike, he should suffer, since he was the cause of it
all.1 The cases do not support this view. They deny reinstatement.
32
The result may be easily justified. Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
33
there is no independent punishment for strikes and sit-downs. The N. L.
R. A. does not provide one, except the failure to reinstate. Therefore to
reinstate here will be to allow sit-down strikes every time the employer has
been unfair. But a failure to reinstate does not give the employer similar
carte blanche. The great bulk of decisions deters him from unfair prac-
tices. Furthermore, he cannot foresee that his men will sit-down and relieve
his punishment. Thus of the two alternatives, that chosen by the court is
preferable. Where the sit-down was peaceful and the employer's conduct
especially unfair, a better solution would be to allow reinstatement without
back pay. Such an order, however, is at present only a possibility.
3. DIFFICULTIES IN INTERPRETING THE ACT
In expanding the scope of reinstatement orders, the courts and the
Board have overcome determined opposition which relied on a narrow read-
ing of the Act. Section 2 (3) provides that employee shall include "any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection
with, any current labor dispute, and who has not obtained any other regular
and substantially equivalent employment . . ." Section IO (c) provides
for reinstatement of employees. An effort could be made to solve admin-
istrative difficulties in terms of these two provisions,34 on the theory that
2 (3) defined a category and io (c) determined its legal incidents. The
result would be that unless a worker could be crowded into the class em-
ployee under the definition of the Act, he was ineligible for reinstatement
or back pay. Thus there could be no award of back pay to one who had
ceased to come under the definition through having obtained substantially
equivalent employment elsewhere, or because of a valid discharge during a
labor dispute. This introduced a further complication in a conflict between
Section 2 (3) and a supposed absolute privilege to discharge.35 The
29. Hart and Prichard, note 5 supra, 1321-22; (1940) 28 CALIF. L. RFv. 402, 405;
(939) 27 CALIF. L. RE. 470, 472.
30. 3o6 U. S. 240 (939).
31. Note 29 supra.
32. Note 25 supra.
33. 47 STAT. 70 (932), 29 U. S. C. A. § ioi et seq. (Supp. 1940).
34. The weakness of such an attempt is exposed in Hart and Prichard, note 5
supra, at 13o9.
35. Fansteel. Metallurgical Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 375 (C. C. A. 7th,
1938).
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Supreme Court in the Fansteel case disposed of this neatly by treating that
privilege as qualified. 6
A narrow reading of the Act would also require holding that there
could be no award of job or pay to one who had never become an employee
because of discriminatory refusal to hire. The impossibility of solving prob-
lems by such play on words is neatly pointed by comparing this logical
result with the wording of Section 8 (3), which expressly includes "dis-
crimination in regard to hire" as an unfair practice.
The cases do not follow this narrow interpretation. Relying on its
power to take "any affirmative action", 37 the Board early allowed back pay
to those no longer capable of reinstatement or who no longer wanted the
job.38  It has been argued that the express mention of reinstatement with
pay precludes pay without reinstatement.3 9 But the Board's solution clearly
effectuates the purpose of the Act. Every argument in favor of a normal
back pay award applies here. Furthermore, such a denial of back pay
might discourage any effort by those unfairly discharged to get other jobs.
40
The Board has been reluctant to impose the duty to seek other employ-
ment.41 There is a hint of such a duty in Subin v. N. L. R. B., 4 2 where
back pay was refused to a woman who had been busy in house work. No
reason for the result was given. It could be supported equally on the
proposition that this was the equivalent of intervening employment, or on
her failure to seek the same. Discharged men should seek work elsewhere.
All reinstatement orders force the employer to hire a man he doesn't want.
4 3
The fewer that are necessary, the less friction will result.
"Reinstatement" of those who never became employees has developed
more slowly. The courts have been bothered by the apparent limit placed
on the power to reinstate by the definition of "employees" 44 Definitions,
however, seldom solve legal problems, and this one especially is too vague
to be of much use.45 The purpose of its inclusion in the statute was to
preserve to strikers a position within the protection of io (c). It is unlikely
that the draftsmen meant thereby to exclude other equally deserving
groups. 46 A discriminatory refusal to hire is just as unfair as a discrimina-
tory discharge. It may easily lead to the same type of unrest, including
strikes. The policy of the Act, therefore, dictates its suppression.
The Board first flew in the face of the narrow meaning of the Statute
to protect former employees laid off for a reason later declared unfair,47 or
36. N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 3o6 U. S. 240, 255 (i939). Com-
pare N. L. R. B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. I (1937) and Associated
Press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 103, 131 (1937) with Black Diamond Steamship Corp.
v. N. L. R. B., 94 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
37. Mooresville Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B., 94 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938),
modified, 97 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
38. See note 28 supra.
39. N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533, 537 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
4o. This argument appears in (939) 48 YALE L. J. 1265, 127o.
41. Matter of New York Handkerchief Mfg. Co., 16 N. L. R. B. 532, 550 (1939).
42. 112 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940); accord, see Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.
L. R. B., 113 F. (2d) 202, 206 (C. C. A. 2d, 194o).
43. This argument is developed in (939) 53 H.iv. L. REV. 141, 142, where a dis-
tinction is drawn between offering employment to an unfairly discharged employee and
to a stranger.
44. Note 39 supra.
45. Its literal meaning is reduced to the absurd in Drinker, note 4 supra, 811-812.
46. Drinker, ibid.; Nathanson and Lyons, Judicial Review of the National Labor'
Relations Board (1939) 33 ILL. L. REv. 749, 762, n. 42.
47. N. L. R. B. v. National Casket Co., Inc., lO7 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
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under cover of a slack season,48 or corporate reorganization.49 Finally in
N. L. R. B. v. Waumbec Mills 50 the court upheld an order in favor of a
man who had never before been employed by the company. The opinion
rested squarely on policy, and rejected the distinction which had been
drawn between rehiring a former employee and hiring a stranger. 51 The
latter step was unusually easy. In the actual case the men discriminated
against were apparently the only two men in New England with the type of
experience the mill required. Therefore they would clearly have gotten
the jobs except for their union records.
Another dogma which has impeded the development of effective orders
has been that they must be remedial and not punitive. The origin of this
notion is obscure; neither word appears in the Act. Its supporters feel
that Congress could not have intended a punitive order, and hint that this
would violate due process. The reason for its popularity is the convenience
of the categories it sets up. If a given order can once be labelled "puni-
tive" or "remedial", the difficult question as to whether or not it effectuates
the purpose of the Act will then answer itself.5 2
This approach is not justified by the cases which are cited to support
it. The leading case for the proposition that orders must be remedial is
Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B.53 It raised the question whether
the Board could set aside a contract made with a union which was not
before the Board. The court held that the union was a necessary party to
the proceedings, and that the Act did not give the Board authority to set
aside contracts in this way. Then followed the dictum that the order must
be remedial. It was not necessary to decide the case. And the case is not
direct authority on the question of reinstatement orders.
Another leading case is N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand.5 4 Remington
Rand moved its plant during a labor dispute. The Board ordered rein-
statement and pay plus the cost of moving to each employee. The court
reversed the latter because there was no proof that in the absence of a dis-
pute the company would have offered transportation to its employees as an
inducement to them to follow the plant. In other words, this was a sum
they would not have made; therefore it should not be included in back pay.
Again there was no need to label the order "punitive" in order to throw it
out. And again the case is not a precedent for appraising orders of pay
which would admittedly have been earned.
The distinction between remedial and punitive orders also fails to
explain the results of the cases. As a matter of fact, any order of rein-
statement with pay is remedial to the employee, and punitive to the em-
ployer.55 But even these normal results are varied in several standard sets
of circumstances. Sit-down strikers are not reinstated. 56 This is less than
a remedy for the injury which has been done them. Employers cannot
deduct from their payments amounts received by the employee in insurance
48. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v. N. L. R. B., 93 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 4th,
1938) ; Matter of Algonquin Printing Co., i N. L. R. B. 264 (1938).
49. Matter of Kelly-Springfield Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 325 (938).
50. 114 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. Ist, 1940). The decision is approved in (1940) 8
U. OF CHI. L. REv. 149, which suggests that the application for work should be a
necessary condition precedent.
51. (1939) 53 HARV. L. RE'. 141.
52. For reasoning of this type see Goldstein, Effectuathng the Policies of the Na-
fionial Labor Relations Act (i94o) 2o B. U. L. REv. 74; (1939) 53 H..v. L. REV. 141.
53. 305 U. S. 197 (1938).
54. 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
55. This dual nature is shown in (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1265 passim.
56. Note 25 supra.
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or union benefits.57  The employee gets paid twice for doing nothing, this
is more than remedial for him, and must strike the employer, at least, as
punitive. Yet both results are well established. Any discussion as to
whether a given order falls into one category or the other can only becloud
the main question: does it, effectuate the purpose of the Act? 's
4. EFFECT OF EMPLOYEE'S CONDUCT
Normally only the employee's misconduct can deprive him of the right
to reinstatement with pay. The commission of a serious crime, or of such
violence as marked the Fansteel strike, where the strikers stood off the
sheriff and his deputies in a pitched battle,50 forfeits his claim to both. This
result is proper. Such violence destroys economic wealth, and breeds a
bitterness which makes peaceful settlement more difficult.60 It should be
restrained, and the forfeiture of reinstatement will have that effect. Fur-
thermore to force a union between employer and employee after such bitter-
ness may be dangerous to the health of the former, and will not encourage
the latter to become a satisfactory or productive workman.
A somewhat similar question arises where the employee breaks a fair
contract properly entered into after collective bargaining. Only two cases
involving this problem have arisen. N. L. R. B. v. Columbian En4mzeling
and Stamping Co.6 was decided as if it involved such a breach of contract,
although the agreement in question had been terminated by the union after
proper notice 62 and was no longer in force. The court held that by striking
in violation of its agreement the men forfeited their right to reinstatement.
The holding was approved in N. L. R. B. v. Sands Manufacturing Co.
63
The union threatened to strike to obtain a system of seniority which was
clearly prohibited by the contract. After a bona fide attempt to settle the
dispute, the employer fired them and reopened the plant with new men.
The court held that by their wilful breach of contract, the men had forfeited
the immunity to discharge during a labor dispute secured them by 2 (3).
In the exact case the policy of the Act in favor of peaceful settlements of
labor disputes supports the result. As the court read the facts, the union
was clearly at fault for preventing a peaceful outcome and deserved punish-
ment. Where the issue is more complicated, a less drastic result should
obtain. Thus if the fault were equally divided, or if the contract was sus-
ceptible of two readings, the normal weighting in favor of the employee,
because he is most severely affected by the order, requires an opposite
holding.
There is one more important question regarding the conduct of
employees under the Act. Is there now a duty not to strike against dis-
criminatory hiring or firing? 64  That would be a logical holding. The
57. Note 17 supra.
58. Compare N. L. R. B. Y. Leviton Mfg. Co., iii F. (2d) 61g (C. C. A. 2d, 1940)
(refusing to enforce an order that the company repay the W. P. A. because punitive)
with Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) and N.
L. R. B. v. Tovrea Packing Co., iii F. (2d) 626 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) (both refusing
recovery to W. P. A. because not authorized by the Act).
59. For a detailed description see Hart and Prichard, note 5 supra.
6o. Standard Lime and Stone Co. v. N. L. R. B., 97 F. (2d) 531 (1938).
61. 96 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), aff'd on grounds that employer had not
refused to bargain, 306 U. S. 292 (1939).
62. I N. L. R. B. I8I, 194 (1936).
63. 306 U. S. 332 (939), 48 YALE L. J. 1422.
64. This possibility is discussed in Larson, The Labor Relations Acts-Their Effect
on Industrial Warfare (1938) 36 MicH. L. REv. 1237, 124o. The existence of such a'
duty should be limited to cases where the unfair practice was discriminatory hiring or
firing, since this is the only unfair practice which can be completely remedied by a rein-
statement order.
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Act provides an efficient remedy against unfairness. It should make unnec-
essary a resort to strikes. One court came to this conclusion, 5 but it has
since been discredited. Again there can be too much emphasis on the words
of the statute. Section 13 says that "nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued so as to interfere with the right to strike". What was the purpose
of that section? It might have been to preserve both the privilege to
strike 66 and the benefits of the Act to those oppressed by unfair conditions.
That is the position of those who deny a duty not to strike. The purpose
might equally have been to preserve the power to strike, despite the duty
not to raised by the logic of the Act. There would be two reasons for such
an interpretation. In the first place it would preserve to the employee all
his weapons in the broad field of struggle not covered by the Act8 7 namely:
where the employer has not been unfair. In the second, since the Act does
not influence the final outcome of the bargain 6 s it would preserve to him
the only real threat with which he can bargain, when the employer does
consent to sit down peacefully with him at the table. The power to strike
would thus exist side by side with the duty not to. The power would be
guaranteed by Section 13. The duty would be enforced by a forfeiture of
rights under Section io.
The cases have gone a little way to develop this duty, mostly by vary-
ing the date from which back pay begins. Men discharged unfairly get
paid from the date of discharge.6 9 Those who strike in sympathy with them
get pay only from the time the employer refuses to reinstate them.70 Since
the original discharge was an unfair practice, the Board might have consid-
ered that it justified the conduct of the strikers, and ordered back pay from
the beginning of the strike. Its more realistic attitude is that during the
strike the men are voluntarily without work, and deserve no pay until they
are refused reinstatement.
The next question is: does an offer of reinstatement under unfair con-
ditions constitute such a refusal? If there is a duty to resort to the Board
rather than to self-help, it should not. The men should be encouraged to
return to work, even under unfair conditions and to take their complaints to
the Board. Obviously commerce would be the better for the cessation of the
strike.
The leading cases on this point are N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber
Co. 71 and the Fansteel 72 case. In the former the men struck against a
refusal to bargain collectively; the mill reopened, hiring only those who
would renounce union affiliations. The court called the imposition of that
condition a discriminatory discharge, and awarded back pay from then on.
In the Fansteel case there was also a strike against unfair conditions; then
a sit-down, an attempt by the employer to discharge the sit-downers, and
gradual reemployment of those who would accept the old unfair conditions.
The Board remarked 73 that the men were obviously unwilling to return to
work, and hence could scarcely protest that the company was unwilling to
65. Charles Cushman Co. v. Markesy, C. C. H. LABOR LAW SEav. 16,372 (Me.
1937) (Chancellor's order, not included in official Maine reports). This is noted in
Larson, note 64 supra, at 126o.
66. An early discussion of this privilege appears in American Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209 (1921).
67. This explanation appears in Drinker, note 4 supra, at 8io.
68. N. L. R. B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 3O U. S. 1, 45 (1937).
6g. See Larson, note 64 supra, 1264, n. io8.
70. Id. at 1262, n. 98.
7. 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
72. 306 U. S. 240 (I939).
73. 5 . L. R. B. 930, 945 (3938).
658 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
rehire them. It allowed reinstatement only on application, and back pay
only if the application was refused. Even this was overruled by the court
because of the sit-down. The cases can easily be distinguished. They show,
however, that the Board is alive to the possibility that it is better to force
men to return to work, even under unfair conditions. From there it is
only a step to hold that any strike for a purpose which could be accom-
plished by the Board forfeits back pay at least.
5. EFFECT OF EMPLOYER'S CONDUCT
Normally the employer cannot escape rehiring his unfairly discharged
employees with back pay. The amount of the award, however, may vary
considerably, often according to the actions of the employer. It may be
cancelled in whole or in part if the employee gets another job.74 Where
the employer has fired men relying on a closed-shop contract,7 5 or where
he has relied on a compromise arranged by a representative of the Board,7 6
or on the report of the trial examiner that his actions are not unfair,7 7 he
need not pay back wages. These deductions are proper because they
encourage him to rely on the Board, and on his contracts with his men.
They should facilitate successful settlements of disputes.
Where the employer has not tried to bring about a peaceful settlement,
he is correspondingly penalized. The lock-out, developed as a preventive
against sit-downs, is an example of the type of practice which the Board
has discouraged. An employer who locks out his men must pay full back
wages, even if they go on strike while locked-out, which would normally
prevent the award of pay during the strike.78  In Matter of American
Potash and Chemical Corp."9 the trial examiner reported that the Board
was without jurisdiction, and the company relied on this report to fire
union men right and left. The Board found that it had jurisdiction, and
awarded back pay. Clearly the employer had done nothing to deserve
sympathy from the Board. In addition his business was apparently on
the borderline of interstate commerce, and the deterrent influence of the
Act was properly extended by this order to other borderline cases.
After the Board's order, a company may actually, or in effect go out
of interstate commerce. A pronounced change in business policy so as
deliberately to effect this result seems unlikely. Should it happen, the
Board would probably still enforce its order for reinstatement. This would
agree with the general rule that only an employee's misconduct can deprive
him of that remedy; it would also prevent borderline industries from delib-
erately avoiding the Board's jurisdiction.
In Matter of Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., 0 the company went bank-
rupt, thus in effect going out of interstate commerce. The award of pay
74. 3 An. Rep. N. L. R. B. (1938) 202, n. 3.
75. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. N. L. R. B., lO3 F. (2d) 157 (C. C. A. 5th,
1939), rev'd, N. L. R. B. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 2o6 (194o). The
Supreme Court approved the Circuit Court's reasoning, but differed in its analysis of
the facts.
76. Matter of Shenadoah-Dives Mining Co., ii N. L. R. B. 885 (1939).
77. This exception was originally made in Matter of Haffelfinger Co., I N. L. R.
B. 76o (1936). It is now customary, 3 An. Rep. N. L. R. B. (1938) 203.
78. Matter of Majestic Flour Mills, 15 N. L. R. B. 541 (1939) ; Matter of Cowell
Portland Cement Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 1O2O (1938), rev'd on other grounds, Io8 F. (2d)
198 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
79. 3 N. L. R. B. 140 (1937), aff'd without comment on this point, 98 F. (2d) 488 "
(C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
80. 2 C. C. H. Labor Law Serv. 18,65o (E. D. Mo., May 6, 1940), 50 COL. L.
REV. 1272.
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had lost all possibility of deterrent effect, at least on this employer, who, in
the words of the court "could not offend again". This left the court with
a conflict of interests between the creditors and the aggrieved workmen.
It chose the creditors, giving no reason except that the award had lost its
deterrent effect. The result is sound, although it cannot be supported
entirely on the policy of the Wagner Act. Technically it is doubtful
whether this was a provable claim in bankruptcy."' Practically the work-
men had not given a quid pro quo, and creditors presumably had. In addi-
tion the court may have felt that the workmen had been at least partially
responsible for the labor dispute which may in turn have speeded the end
of the company.
Where the employer passed through one of the many reincarnations
available to business entities, the new firm is generally visited with the sins
of the old.82 In N. L. R. B. v. Colten,s3 a reinstatement order was enforced
against a surviving partner, who was continuing the business. The court
disregarded the common law dogma that a partnership ceases on the death
of one member. Such a doctrine would be of little value in effectuating the
Act. To have respected it might have opened a way for any firm to avoid
the effects of the an order by simply dissolving. The estate of the dead
partner was also made jointly and severally liable for the back pay award.
As in the Hamilton Brown case the result turns on balancing interests and
not on interpreting the Act. Here the court had to choose between the
wronged employees, who were not in this case to be held liable for the
partner's death (though this point might be disputed by worried em-
ployers), and the heirs of one who had wronged them. Comparing taking
from the latter what they might not have had if the partner had lived a
few days longer with the hardship on the employee of an opposite result, the
court's solution is comprehensible.
An important case which opposes the general trend is N. L. R. B. v.
Timken Silent Automatic Co.§4 A wholly-owned subsidiary corporation
was ordered to reinstate with back pay. Then the parent conveyed all the
subsidiary's property to itself, dissolving the subsidiary, which was kept
alive by local statute only to wind up its affairs. The Board filed an
amended order against both, but looking principally to the parent, as suc-
cessor to the business, for payment. The court granted a petition for en-
forcement against the subsidiary, but denied it against the parent. In
vacuo the result is indefensible. Actually the parent was by contract liable
for the subsidiary's debts, and the result as far as payment was the same
no matter which was primarily liable. The decision, however, may well
establish a harmful precedent.
6. CONCLUSION
The foregoing examination reveals the following general rules gov-
erning the use of reinstatement and back pay in typical situations:
(i) A discriminatory firing or refusal to hire usually leads to rein-
statement with pay.
(2) Only conduct by the unfairly discharged employee can deprive
him of his right to reinstatement and to pay during the period when the
8i. The opinion relied heavily on this point.
82. This general problem is raised in Note (939) 53 HARv. L. REv. 301, 308.
83. 105 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
84. 114 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), enforcing i N. L. R. B. 335 (1936),
amended in ii N. L. R. B. 9o6 (1939), (940) 54 HARV. L. REv. 342 (discussing the
jurisdictional question involved).
66o UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
employer was clearly guilty of an unfair practice. Resort to violence in the
course of the dispute will deprive him of both. Refusal to work under fair
conditions may deprive him of his pay.
(3) An employee who strikes against an unfair practice forfeits his pay
during the period of the strike. If the strike is a breach of a contract with
the employer, he also forfeits his right to reinstatement.
(4) An employer must rehire his unfairly discharged employees unless
they have forfeited that right. He must pay back wages over the period
when his failure to employ them was clearly an unfair practice. If he
locks them out, he must pay full wages, and cannot take advantage of con-
duct on their part which would ordinarily forfeit back pay.
(5) The employer's duties will be enforced against him even if he
subsequently avoids the jurisdiction of the Board. They will be enforced
against his successor if the successor carries on substantially the same
buiness.
(6) Where the interests created by an order conflict with interests of
third parties, no general rules govern priority; the court will weigh the
facts in the particular case.
These rules cannot be explained by a strict reading of the definitions
and provisions of the Act. Nor are they clarified by resort to the labels
"punitive" and "remedial". However, examination of the effects of the
orders on the parties concerned shows that the orders encourage both
employer and employee to seek a peaceful settlement of labor disputes, and
if this fails, to resort to the Board rather than to strife.
F. L. B., Jr.
The Mitigating Effect of a Locus Pcnitentim in Recovery of
Benefits Conferred Under Illegal Contracts
Generally speaking, a party to an illegal contract is not permitted to
recover benefits he has rendered thereunder.1 The refusal to adjudicate
claims arising through transactions tainted with illegality or immorality
has its basis in public policy, it being assumed that the absence of judicial
cognizance materially reduces the tendency to enter into unlawful trans-
actions. 2  However, while the plaintiff is penalized for his impropitious
action by the court's reticence to listen to his prayer, it is just as true that
the defendant, who is every bit as guilty, is unjustly enriched. Perhaps
the latter factor tends to increase the temptation to evade the law and ignore
the public policy and morals of the community and thus to offset the advan-
tages derived from penalizing the plaintiff.3 The fact that civil courts
1. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 598; 5 Wn.LSTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed.
1937) § 163o; United States v. Galbreath, 8 F. (2d) 36o (N. D. Cal. 1925). Repre-
sentative cases are: Smith v. California Thorn Cordage, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 93, 18
P. (2d) 393 (1933) ; Chapman v. Haley, 117 Ky. Ioo4, 8o S. W. i9o (904) ; Bryant
v. Wilcox, 137 Mich. 669, ioo N. W. 918 (I9O4); Johnson v. Owen, 72 Neb. 477,
ioo N. W. 945 (904); New York & Pa. Co. v. Cunard Coal Co., 286 Pa. 72, 132
Atl. 828 (1926); Ellis v. Peoples Nat. Bk. of Manassas, I66 Va. 389, i86 S. E. 9
(1936).
2. See RESTATEMENT, RFSTITUTION (937) § 140, comment a; RESTAT MENT,
TRUSTS (1935) § 422, comment a; 5 W.LISTON, CONRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1630;
6 R. C. L. (1915) § 221; Ullman v. St. Louis Fair Assoc., 167 Mo. 273, 66 S. W.
949, 952 (1902).
3. See WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS (1913) § 135. "The law finds itself in close"
quarters at this point. . . . On the one hand, it must needs withhold its sanction
from contracts entered into for criminal purposes; and, on the other hand, it ought not
go so far as to offer undue inducement to beneficiaries of contracts to taint them with
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usually leave penalization to law enforcement agencies, the tendency to
restore parties to the status quo where other remedies are inappropriate,
and the questionable forcefulness of the policy behind the rule, have led
courts to adopt a number of exceptions to their usual refusal to hear claims
involving illegal transactions.
The only safe generalization on the question of when an illegal trans-
action may become the basis of a cognizable law suit seems to be that the
court will provide a remedy when, to them, the policy of so doing out-
weighs the policy against listening to the claim.4 While such a statement
is admittedly little aid to the prospective litigant, it serves to summarize and
illustrate the confused state of decisions on the subject. In an effort to
attain some conformity, or perhaps to provide legal reasons for desired
decisions, several rules have been devised to assist the court in its decision
as to whether or not the parties should be left in the position their nefarious
undertaking put them.
Thus, it is stated that a party to an illegal contract may recover bene-
fits conferred thereunder (i) where he is ignorant of the fact which made
the contract illegal,5 or (2) where the parties are not in pari delicto,6 or
(3) where refusal to rescind the contract would produce a harmful effect on
parties for whose protection the law making the contract illegal exists,7 or
(4) where the illegal part of the bargain is "unexecuted". s But a majority
of the courts will not apply any of the exceptions if they consider the party
to be guilty of "serious moral turpitude"," or if the act contemplated is
thought to be inalum in se.10
Assuming the plaintiff's inability to enforce the agreement because of
illegality and to recover back benefits conferred by virtue of any of the
first three above-noted exceptions, it becomes relevant to inquire into the
mitigating effect of repentence before "execution" by the plaintiff, the
so-called doctrine of locus pamnitentix.
criminality for the very purpose of avoiding liability thereon after receiving the benefits
of performance by the other party, lest the latter evil become greater than the first."
Harbison v. Shirley, 139 Iowa 6o5, 6o8, 117 N. W. 963, 964 (i9o8).
4. The problem has been discussed on this basis. Hobbs v. Boatright, 195 Mo.
693, 93 S. W. 934 (1906) ; Meredith v. Fullerton, 83 N. H. 124, 139 At. 359 (927) ;
Duddy-Robinson Co. v. Taylor, 137 Wash. 304, 242 Pac. 21 (1926); see Gilchrist v.
Hatch, 183 Ind. 371, 376, io6 N. E. 694, 696 (1914); 13 C. J. 497; Note (1913) 26
HARv. L. REv. 738.
5. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 599; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 137;
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1631, and authority there cited.
6. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 604; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 138;
6 WnLusToN, CONTRACTS § 1789, and authority there cited.
7. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 60i; 5 WnIIST N, CONTRACTS § 1632; and
see Fergus County v. Osweiler, io7 Mont. 466, 86 P. (2d) 410 (1938), 12o A. L. R.
r461 (1939); and see the following representative cases: Herman v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., io8 F. (2d) 678 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); Cameron v. International Alliance
of Theatrical Stage Employees, iig N. J. Eq. 577, 183 Atl. i57, cert. denied, 298
U. S. 659 (1936); Mt. Vernon Trust Co. v. Bergoff, 272 N. Y. 192, 5 N. E. (2d)
i96 (1936) (937) 22 CoRN. L. Q. 380; Bay Parkway Nat. Bk. of Brooklyn v.
Shalom, 27o N. Y. 172, 20o N. E. 685 (936), 22 IOWA L. REv. 156; O'Connor v.
Bankers Trust Co., 159 Misc. 920, 289 N. Y. Supp. 252 (Sup. Ct. 1936), affd, 253 App.
Div. 714, I N. Y. S. (2d) 641 (ist Dep't 1937), aff'd, 278 N. Y. 649, 16 N. E. (2d) 302
(1938).
8. RESTATEimENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 605; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1788;
WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 144; KEENER, QUAsI-CONTRAcTs (1893) 258; 13 C.
J. 5o2; 6 R. C. L. § 221 ; and authorities and cases cited in subsequent notes.
g. The Restatement of Contracts so limits all of their rules in the above cited sec-
tions. For decisions so limiting the right to recover under the last-noted exception, see
notes 44 and 45 infra.
io. Keener and Woodward in above cited sections say the recovery is so limited.
For cases see notes 43 and 45 infra.
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It is important first, however, to distinguish actions wherein the alleged
illegality is properly only extrinsic or collateral to the actual claim involved
in the litigation."- Thus, it has been held that plaintiff may recover for
goods damaged in transit although he was dealing improperly under a
fictitious name, the illegal act of plaintiff having no necessary relation to
defendant's obligation as a common carrier to carefully deliver the goods.' 2
Some courts have re-phrased this exception to permit suits wherein the
plaintiff can and does state a good cause of action without having to plead
or rely on the illegal transaction.18 Still in other cases substantially the
same reason seems to underlie the thought that "where a statute prohibits
an act or annexes a penalty to its commission, it is true that the act is made
unlawful, but it does not follow that the unlawfulness of the act was meant
by the legislature to avoid a contract made in contravention of it." 14 Where
nothing inferring reprehensible conduct appears, the contract itself may be
enforced,'5 though in some instances the court would permit only recovery
of benefits conferred.' 6 And when the illegality is collateral in the sense that
the contract is illegal only because of an intended improper use of the pro-
ceeds, knowledge of the other's improper purpose will not preclude recov-
ery 17 unless a specific act has been performed to further the wrongful
purpose.1
8
It is also important to distinguish cases where statute or public policy
determines the contract to be void without imposing other penalty. Where
nothing inferring reprehensible conduct appears, recovery of benefits con-
ferred thereunder will, of course, be permitted.19 And where an illegal
ii. Illegality was collateral only and did not preclude recovery in National Bk. &
Loan Co. v. Petrie, 189 U. S. 423 (1903) (where plaintiff was fraudulently induced to
purchase illegal bonds) ; Lasswell Land & Lumber Co. v. Lee Wilson & Co., 236 Fed.
322 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916) (where contract was made by plaintiff corporation in state
wherein it was not licensed to do business) ; Zytka v. Dmochowski, 302 Mass. 63, 18
N. E. (2d) 332 (1938) (where planitiff entrusted proposed husband with money and
the two co-habited for some time, but never married) ; Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Mass.
251 (187i) (where plaintiff sued for damages to his sleigh which he had improperly
hired out to defendant on a Sunday) ; Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen, 276 N. Y. 274, 11
N. E. (2d) 908 (1937) (where plaintiff sued for milk sold and delivered although he
was improperly operating as a milk dealer without a license). Similar cases are: Con-
nolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (i92) ; Ayew v. Willard Hawes & Co.,
Inc., 250 App. Div. 596, 295 N. Y. Supp. 49 (ist Dep't 1937) ; Jeffrey & Co. v. Barn-
ford, [1921] 2 K. B. 351; Marrs v. Thompson, 86 L. T. R. 759 (1902) ; see Dent v.
Ferguson, 132 U. S. 50, 66-67 (1889). Contra: Colbert v. Ashland Const. Co., Inc.,
I1 S. E. (2d) 612 (Va. 1940).
82. Wood v. Erie Ry. Co., 72 N. Y. 196 (878).
13. In re T. H. Bunch Co., 18o Fed. 519 (E. D. Ark. gio) ; Martin v. Hodge, 47
Ark. 378 (1886); It re Estate of Lowe, io4 Neb. 147, 175 N. W. 1015 (192o);
Edward Stern & Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 269 Pa. 559, 112 Atl. 865 (192);
Potamkin v. Wells Fargo & Co., 63 Pa. Super. 222 (1916) ; see Armstrong v. American
Exchange Nat. Bk. of Chicago, 133 U. S. 433, 469 (889o) ; Burke v. Harris, 91 Ark.
205, 209, 120 S. W. 979, 980 (19o9) ; cf. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 6oo.
14. Headnote from Harris v. Runnels, 53 U. S. 79 (1851).
i5. National Bk. v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621 (1878) ; Gammon v. Howard W. Scott,
Inc., 16 F. (2d) 9o2 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927) ; Reichardt v. Hill, 236 Fed. 817 (C. C. A.
6th, 1916); Carland v. Heckler, 233 Fed. 504 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916); Fischer-Liemann
Const. Co. v. Haase, 29 N. E. (2d) 46 (Ohio, 1940) ; Eastern B. & L. Ass'n v. Snyder,
98 Va. 780, 37 S. E. 298 (19oo) ; Toledo Tie & Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 33 W. Va.
566, 11 S. E. 37 (89o).
16. Logan County Bank v. Townsend, 139 U. S. 67 (1891); Louisiana v. Wood,
8O2 U. S. 294 (880).
17. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 602 (1) ; 6 WilUlSTON, CONTRACTS § 1754,
and authority there cited, to which add: Waugh v. Beck, X14 Pa. 422, 6 At. 923 (8886).
18. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 6o2 (2) ; 6 WiLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1755,"
and authority there cited.
ig. American Life Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Alassin Temple Ben. Ass'n, 238 Ala. 512,
191 So. 903 (1939); American-LaFrance & Foamite Ind., Inc. v. Arlington County,
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contract has been induced by fraud or duress, the party oppressed, unless
guilty of seriously reprehensible conduct, may rescind the agreement and
recover benefits conferred, either on the theory that the parties are not in
pari delicto,20 or on the theory that the rescission is granted because of the
fraud or oppression which is anterior to and quite independent of the
illegality.21
The doctrine of locus paenitentiaE becomes important when the plaintiff
seeks to recover benefits conferred in performance of the illegal agreement,
which involves necessarily pleading the improper transaction. His action
is justified by the implied assertion that he has seen the error of his ways
and has rescinded the improper agreement before any publicly harmful
action has occurred thereunder. Thus, the plaintiff must show that the
contemplated illegality remains executory.
2 2
The earliest English case involving facts which would permit use of
the doctrine was Walker v. Chapman,23 where recovery of money paid to
procure a place in the Customs was permitted, defendant having refused
to do anything about securing the position for plaintiff, although the
attempted bribe was clearly illegal. The reasons for so deciding are not,
however, clear; but the early thought seems to have been that any party
would be permitted to rescind an illegal agreement and recover benefits
conferred thereunder, although he could not be heard to sue on the con-
tract in an effort to enjoy the benefits of it.24  Thus, two cases followed
which permitted recovery of money paid under contracts in which the
illegality had been executed.
25
In i78o Justice Buller announced in Lowry v. Bourdieu,26 apparently
for the first time, the distinction between recovery of benefits conferred
under executory illegal contracts and under executed illegal contracts,
refusing recovery because the situation presented was of the latter type.
The distinction, however, seems to have been promptly forgotten. A nisi
prius decision 27 in 179o denied recovery of a wager still in the stakehold-
er's hands where the event upon which the bet depended had occurred; and
in Munt v. Stokes 28 it was held that where executors had paid money bor-
rowed by their testator upon an illegal loan, they could not recover it back
in an action for money had and received, Justice Buller referring to the
Lowry case, but not invoking a distinction on the basis of execution. How-
16- Va. I, 192 S. E. 758 (1937) ; Ryan v. KVL, Inc., i98 Wash. 459, 88 P. (2d) 836
(639).
2o. Colby v. Title Ins. Co., i6o Cal. 632, 117 Pac. 913 (19I1) ; Gilchrist v. Hatch,
183 Ind. 371, io6 N. E. 694 (914) ; Bryant v. Peck & Whipple Co., 154 Mass. 460, 28
N. E. 678 (i8gi). But cf. Union Exchange Bank v. Joseph, 231 N. Y. 250, 131 N. E.
905 (1921).
21. National Bank & Loan Co. v. Petrie, I89 U. S. 423 (I9o3).
22. The rule was clearly expressed in Wasserman v. Sloss, 117 Cal. 425, 428, 49
Pac. 566, 568 (1897): ". . . the good or bad morals of this undertaking are imma-
terial, for the reason that the venture was in no sense executed, and until executed both
parties are given an opportunity for repentance and rescission. Seeing the error of his
ways, the law says a party may withdraw from the transaction; and it extends to him
a helping hand by offering the inducement of giving back to him anything of value with
which he has parted."
23. Lofft 342, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 684 (K. B. 1773).
24. ". . . there is a great difference where a party comes to overturn an illegal
contract, and to be relieved against it, he shall not be relieved if he comes to take the
benefit of an illegal contract; . . .". Id. at 345, 98 Eng. Rep. R. at 685.
:25. Alcinbrook v. Hall, 2 Wils. 309 (C. P. 1776) ; Jaques v. Golightly, 2 Black.
W. Io73, 96 Eng. Rep. R. 632 (Exch. 1776).
26. 2 Doug. 468, 471, 99 Eng. Rep. R. 299, 300 (K. B. 1780).
27. Carmm v. Alder, Nisi Prius (1790), not reported, but discussed in Cotton v.
Thurland, 5 T. R. 405, 1oI Eng. Rep. R. 227 (K B. 1793).
28. 4 T. R. 561, IOO Eng. Rep. R. 1176 (K. B. 1792).
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ever, without expressly referring to execution, the court in Cotton v. Thur.
land 29 permitted recovery of a wager still in the hands of a stakeholder
after occurrence of the event upon which the bet depended, Chief Justice
Kenyon expressly disapproving of the earlier nisi 15rius decision contra.
Oddly enough, the next case, 30 decided in 1798, permitted recovery of an
illegal wager after the event of the wager, a stakeholder not being involved,
apparently reverting to the original thought that any party to illegality
should be permitted to rescind and recover back. 31 But in Hawson v. Han-
cock,3 " the court decided that after an illegal wager had been paid over to
one of the parties, it could not be recovered back, and Lord Kenyon's
statement therein, that ". . . there is no case to be found where, when
money has been actually paid by one of the two parties to the other upon
an illegal contract, both being participes criminis, an action has been main-
tained to recover back again",3 was flagrantly inaccurate.34 Several cases
followed in which the plaintiff was denied recovery, 5 but Justice Heath in
the important case of Tappenden v. Randall,"6 in which the plaintiff recov-
ered back money paid for a bond clearly illegal though not seriously crim-
inal when the illegal condition of payment of the bond had not as yet
occurred, revived and carefully approved of the distinction between exe-
cuted and executory illegal contracts and added a new element: that recov-
ery might be denied even when purely executory if the contemplated
illegality was "too grossly immoral".3
In Aubert v. Walsh,3s which was an action to recover back a premium
on a war policy, brought before the event had happened, the plaintiff was
held entitled to recover, Lord Mansfield following the Lowry and Tappen-
den cases. The case, however, raised the next logical question: how far
may the plaintiff permit matters to go before rescinding? In the Aubert
case plaintiff had waited until defendant had become bankrupt and until he
had seen the commissioners refuse similar claims from the bankrupt's
estate, i. e., until he was sure that pursuance of the illegal venture could
only end in loss, before he rescinded. Still, said the court, time for the
happening of the event must be the dead line for rescission because before
that time plaintiff had not taken his chance on winning, and permitting
recovery before that time relieves ". . . against the effects which an illegal
contract, persevered in, would produce." '9
29. 5 T. R. 405, loi Eng. Rep. R. 227 (K. B. 1793).
3o. Lacaussade v. White, 7 T. R. 535, Ioi Eng. Rep. R. 1118 (K. B. 1798).
31. ". . . it (is) . . . more consonant to the principles of sound policy and
justice, that where-ever money has been paid upon an illegal consideration, it may be
recovered back again by the party who has thus improperly paid it, than by denying
the remedy to give effect to the illegal contract." Ibid.
32. 8 T. R. 575, ioi Eng. Rep. R. 1555 (K. B. 18oo).
33. Id. at 577, ioi Eng. Rep. R. at 1556.
34. See Aubert v. Walsh, 3 Taunt. 277, 283, 128 Eng. Rep. R. 1iO, 113 (Ch. i8io),
in which Ch. J. Mansfield points out that L. Kenyon must certainly have misconstrued
the Lacaussade case.
35. Vandyck v. Hewitt, I East. 96, io2 Eng. Rep. R. 39 (K. B. i8oo); Morck v.
Abel, 3 Bos. & Pul. 35, 127 Eng. Rep. R. 20 (C. P. 3802); Lubbock v. Potts, 7 East.
449, 103 Eng. Rep. R. 174 (K. B. 38o6) ; Shiffner v. Gordon, 12 East. 296, 104 Eng.
Rep. R. 116 (K. B. i8io).
36. 2 Bos. & Pul. 467, 126 Eng. Rep. R. 1388 (C. P. 38Ol).
37. "It seems to me that the distinction . . . between contracts executory and
executed . . . is a sound distinction. Undoubtedly there may be cases where the
contract may be of a nature too grossly immoral for the Court to enter into any dis-
cussion of it; . . . But where nothing of that kind occurs, I think there ought to
be a locus pcenitentia, and that a party should not be compelled against his will to
adhere to the contract." Id. at 471, 126 Eng. Rep. R. at 1390.
38. 3 Taunt. 277, 128 Eng. Rep. R. Iio (Ch. 18io).
39. Id. at 283, 128 Eng. Rep. R. at 113.
NOTES
By i8io the rules were thus rather clearly defined: (I) ordinarily,
parties to an illegal transaction, being participes criminis and in pari delicto,
were barred by force of the rule that melior est conditio possidentis; but
(2) when the contract was not "too grossly immoral" and repentance
occurred while the contract was yet executory, a party was permitted to
rescind and recover benefits conferred thereunder in an action of assumpsit
for money had and received; (3) the contract was executory until the event
or action contemplated, for which plaintiff conferred benefits, or the time
for such event, occurred; and (4) repentance was accomplished by any
notice sufficient to appraise the other party of a determination to avoid the
contract. 40 The plaintiff, who thus availed himself of a locus pcwnitentiw,
was permitted recovery, not to award the penitent, but to encourage
repentance and to thereby prevent the result which pursuance of the illegal
transaction would produce and thus to diminish the possibility of an infrac-
tion of the established law and order.
Although the rules may thus be easily stated, application to fact situa-
tions has proved considerably more difficult and in many cases has led to
modification and change. Obvious difficulties arose in determining when
a transaction was so seriously improper that a locus pwenitentiae would be
denied, and in determining at which stage the transaction becomes executed
to the extent that a locus pwnitentiae would be denied.
A carry-over from the general antithesis against recognizing illegal
transactions led to a distinction between transactions on the basis of the
seriousness of the illegality involved.41 Perhaps the thought that cog-
nizance of serious offenses as a predication of civil rights would lower the
dignity of the court, ignore an excellent oportunity to impose a deserved
punishment, and encourage violation of law 42 prompted the courts to adopt
the distinction. The similarity to criminal jurisprudence apparently sug-
gested the much-discussed and often-criticized distinction between acts
malum in se and acts malum prohibitum. As a result, a probable majority
of courts have refused to apply the doctrine of locus penitentie when the
contemplated act was serious enough to be regarded malum in se. 3 Other
courts have phrased the distinction as one between acts involving "moral
turpitude" and those that do not,44 although they do not appear to be stat-
ing a different rule since many of the courts have used the terms inter-
changeably.45 The Virginia court seems to have drawn a more stringent
rule by distinguishing between contracts simply "invalid" because of
improper formation or terms of performance or other formal matters and
contracts "illegal" because of an immoral or punishable purpose.4' How-
ever, some courts have either overlooked any distinction on the basis of the
4o. See Busk v. Walsh, 4 Taunt. 290, 128 Eng. Rep. R. 340 (C. P. 1812), wherein
plaintiff was allowed to recover after the event upon which he had wagered because he
had sought to present a claim for the benefits he conferred in defendant's bankruptcy
proceedings before the event, his claim having been rejected.
41. See note 37 supra.
42. WooWAD, QUAsI CONTRACTs § 135.
43. Maryland Trust Co. v. National Mechanics Bk., lo2 Md. 6o8, 63 At. 7o
(19o6) ; Fitzgerald v. Guaranty Security Corp., 239 Mass. 174, 131 N. E. 463 (1921);
Boyer v. Garner, i5 S. W. (2d) 893 (Mo. App. 1929).
44. McRae v. Warmack, 98 Ark. 52, 135 S. W. 807 (1911); see Brashears v.
Giannini, 131 Cal. App. 7o6, 711, 22 P. (2d) 47, 49, cert. denied, 290 U. S. 700 (933);
Duane v. Merchant's Legal Stamp Co., 227 Mass. 466, 469, 116 N. E. 873, 875 (1917).
45. Boyer v. Garner, 15 S. W. (2d) 893 (Mo. App. 1929); see Chesnutt v.
Schwartz, 293 Ill. App. 414, 422, 12 N. E. (2d) 912, 915 (1938).
46. American-LaFrance & Foamite Ind., Inc. v. Arlington County, i69 Va. 1, 192
S. E. 758 (i937).
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seriousness of the crime involved or have been totally unaware of it,4 7 and
others have flatly and expressly refused to adopt or follow any such
distinction.
48
It seems clear from an examination of the cases that any distinction
drawn between transactions malum in se and prohibita or transactions
involving moral turpitude and those that do not are more explanatory of a
result reached on considerations of expediency rather than determinative
of the result arrived at. Thus, the terms are usually stated without defini-
tion, and a decision invoking such a distinction with a serious attempt to
actually. place the fact situation involved in one or the other category is
rarely found. Usually the transaction is merely assumed to fit into one
category or another without comment although the categorization may be
highly debatable. It is interesting to note that in one of the rare cases in
which the distinction was seriously contemplated,49 the court argued at
length to establish the proposition that the transaction was more than
malum prohibitum so that recovery would be denied in a fact situation that
might very well have been considered not to involve serious illegality, the
transaction simply being an attempt to reduce the capital stock of a corpo-
ration in a manner other than that provided by the state code. Also in the
Virginia case mentioned above, 50 although a stringent distinction was
invoked, recovery was permitted apparently because the court thought
that a municipality should not be permitted to acquire property under an
improper contract and by virtue of such invalidity avoid paying for or
returning the property.
It follows that a distinction on the basis of the seriousness of the illegal-
ity is sufficiently impractical as to be of questionable merit. It does not
follow, however, as has been suggested,51 that recovery should be permitted
in every case without regard to the seriousness of the illegality involved.
It is well argued that "the reasoning of the decisions would apply regardless
of the degree of corruption involved in the original arrangement",5 2 i. e.,
the seriousness of the offense has little relevancy in deciding whether or not
perpetration of the offense would be avoided by requiring the intended
perpetrator to restore the means or inducement of perpetration. But the
argument itself suggests the proper solution: not that recovery should be
granted, but that relief should be granted or denied on the basis of whether
or not the ends of the law or public considerations are better served by
granting or denying relief with respect to the particular fact situation before
the court. And it appears that the majority of the cases are so decided
regardless of the courts' verbal adherence to a categorical distinction. 1 If
uniformity is thereby sacrificed, perhaps it should be subservient to the
logic and justice of construing a rule against enforcing rights arising under
47. Wasserman v. Sloss, H7 Cal. 425, 49 Pac. 566 (i897) (bribing government
officials) ; Burgess v. Manchester Inv. Co., 186 S. W. 1144 (Mo. App. 1916) (lease to
plaintiff of a building to be used as a bawdy house, the court saying nothing about
moral turpitude) ; Sykes v. Thompson, i6o N. C. 348, 76 S. E. 252 (192) (contract
to stifle prosecution) ; Falkenburg v. Allen, I8 Okla. 210, 90 Pac. 4,5 (i9o7) (wager
on a race plaintiff thought was "fixed") ; Aikman v. City of Wheeling, 120 W. Va. 46.
195 S. E. 667 (938) (effort to stifle prosecution) ; Taylor v. Bowers, i Q. B. D. 291
(1876) (property conveyed in fraud of creditors).
48. Greenberg v. Evening Post Ass'n, 91 Conn. 371, 99 Atl. 1037 (1917) ; Mere-
dith v. Fullerton, 83 N. H. 124, 139 Atl. 359 (927).
49. Maryland Trust Co. v. National Mechanics Bk., io2 Md. 6o8, 63 Atl. 70
(I9O6).
5o. American-LaFrance & Foamite Ind., Inc. v. Arlington County i69 Va. I, I92
S. E. 758 (I937).
52. See note 48 supra; Note (913) 26 HARV. L. REv. 738.
52. Greenberg v. Evening Post Ass'n, 92 Conn. 372, 376, 99 Atl. IO37, io39 (1917).
53. As indicated in the prior paragraph.
NOTES
illegal transactions, which is solely based on considerations of policy, in the
light of public expediency.
In determining whether performance has so far progressed that the
opportunity to repent and recoup has passed, at least three views have been
taken: (I) some courts state flatly that any execution whatsoever bars
the right to recover.54 Logically this view is absurd because it is quite
obvious that any benefits conferred under the contract would constitute
sufficient performance to bar recovery of the benefits. Perhaps it is meant
that any execution on defendant's part will bar plaintiff's recovery. It is
often stated that partial execution bars recovery, 55 the degree not being
specified. The real basis of course is not execution of the contract, but
execution of the illegality,56 the majority of courts preferring the rule that
accomplishment of any part of the illegal object bars recovery. 7 (2) A
minority of courts prefer to grant relief insofar as the illegality remains
unexecuted, regardless of execution of part. 8 (3) Still other courts would
disregard any distinction on the basis of execution and grant relief when-
ever it appears to the court that public policy is better served thereby.5 9 It
has also been stated that recovery will be denied if performance has pro-
ceeded to the state that it would be impossible to replace the parties in the
status quo."' And finally, two courts apparently, while refusing to restore
benefits conferred when the illegality is partially executed, will interfere at
least to rescind the unexecuted portion of the contract when it appears that
such action is wise from a policy standpoint."-
The views thus vary widely, and it therefore becomes relevant to
decide which, if any, is better supported by logic. Since the doctrine of
locus pcenitentia' is founded in the policy of preventing the consummation
of the contemplated violation of law, it-would appear that the definition of
the rule should serve this purpose. Thus, there need be no relief granted
where the illegal object has been fully consummated, prevention of some-
.thing already accomplished being impossible. And where the illegal object
5.4. Brown v. Peterson, 27 Ariz. 418, 233 Pac. 89.5, rehearing denied, 28 Ariz. 121,
235 Pac. 1117 (1925) ; Vock v. Vock, 365 Ill. 432, 6 N. E. (2d) 843 (1937) ; Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Holmes, IS Okla. 92, go Pac. 22 (19o7).
55. Brown v. Peterson, 27 Ariz. 418, 425, 233 Pac. 895, 897 (1925) ; Schmitt v.
Gibson, 12 Cal. App. 407, 414, 107 Pac. 571, 574 (i9io); Vock v. Vock, 365 Ill. 432,
435, 6 N. E. (2d) 843, 845 (1937) ; Johnson v. Owen, 72 Neb. 477, 482, 1oo N. W.
945, 946 (1904) ; Boyd v. Boyd, 112 Ore. 658, 662, 230 Pac. 541, 543 (1924).
56. Taylor v. Bowers, I Q. B. D. 291, 296-297 (x876); WOODWARD, QUASI CON-
TRACTS § i44 (3).
57. Greenberg v. Evening Post Ass'n, 91 Conn. 371, 377, 09 AtI. 1O37, 1O39 (1917);
Ullman v. St. Louis Fair Ass'n, 167 Mo. 273, 287, 66 S. W. 949, 952 (I9o2); New
Century Mfg. Co. v. Scheurer, 45 S. W. (2d) 56o, 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) ; Kearly
v. Thomson, 24 Q. B. D. 742, 747 (89o).
58. Spring Co. v. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 49 (i88o); Souhegan Nat Bank v. Wal-
lace, 6i N. H. 24 (1881) ; Boyd v. Boyd, 112 Ore. 658, 230 Pac. 541 (1924) ; see Lead-
better v. Hawley, 59 Ore. 422, 428, 117 Pac. 5o5, 5o6 (i91i) (rehearing denied).
59. Hobbs v. Boatright, 195 Mo. 693, 93 S. W. 934 (igo6); Meredith v. Fullerton,
83 N. H. 124. 139 AtI. 359 (1927) ; Ryan v. K V L, Inc., 198 Wash. 459, 88 P. (2d)
836 (1939) ; Duddy-Robinson Co. v. Taylor, 137 Wash. 304, 242 Pac. 21 (1926) ; see
Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. Casualty Co., 41 F. (2d) 588, 591 (C. C. A. 7th,
1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 893 (930) ; Gilchrist v. Hatch, 183 Ind. 371, 376, io6
N. E. 694, 696 (1914).
6o. Lunsford v. First Nat. Bk. of Birmingham, 224 Ala. 679, 681, 141 So. 673, 674
(1932) ; Edwards v. Goldsboro, 141 N. C. 6o, 74, 53 S. E. 652, 656 (igo6) ; American-
LaFrance & Foamite Ind., Inc. v. Arlington County, 169 Va. 1, 9, 192 S. E. 758, 76T
0937).
6r. Schley v. Andrews, 225 N. Y. 110, 121 N. E. 812 (1919) ; Hodler v. Hodler,
95 Ore. i8o, 185 Pac. 241 (1919) ; see DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 2o6, 209,
23 N. Y. Supp. 912, 916 (2d Dep't 1937) ; Darling v. Darling, 241 App. Div. 57, 58, 270
N. Y. Supp. 557, 56o (4th Dep't 1934).
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is wholly unperformed, court action which will tend to discourage, if not
prevent, an attempt to perform the contemplated illegality is perfectly
proper. It seems to follow that where the improper objective has been
partially performed, and court action will tend to prevent further perform-
ance, the action should be taken. Thus, partial execution of the contract
or the illegality should not present an objection to application of the rule
of locus pacnitentiae unless it appears that such partial execution, for some
reason, is responsible for a situation in which court action will be unavailing.
It is stated as a general rule that recovery will not be permitted
(although the illegal object is wholly unexecuted and the contemplated
illegality does not involve serious moral turpitude) where by reason of the
intervention of the authorities or the action of a third person the illegal
purpose has been thwarted or its accomplishment made impossible.62 Where
accomplishment is impossible, the court ceases to concern itself with the
matter because court action to avert, if possible, the violation of law is
unnecessary.6 It is not true, however, that recovery will be denied because
the illegality will not be accomplished by reason of the defendant's absolute
refusal to perform the illegal object.64 Apparently, as long as the oppor-
tunity, however slim, of accomplishment remains, action will be taken.
Various statements by the courts, therefore, that recovery should be denied
because plaintiff's attempted rescission did not spring from any feeling of
repentance 65 or from a desire to relinquish the intention to carry out the
illegal transaction 66 are improper as overlooking the fact that the object
bf the rule of locus pamitentiae is to avoid legal violation, and not to aid
the penitent.
6 7
Thus, if plaintiff gave defendant $500 to murder X and X died a
natural death before defendant could murder him, recovery of the $500
should be denied plaintiff, not because plaintiff's rescission did not spriig
from a true feeling of repentance, 8 and not because the transaction involved
serious moral turpitude,68 but because recovery will not aid in discouraging
the contemplated illegality. However, where X continues to live and
defendant refuses positively and absolutely to perform the act, recovery
will be permitted, unless the court adopts the rule limiting recovery to
cases involving no serious moral turpitude, because commission of the act
is theoretically still within the realm of possibility. Although practically
"thwarted," the contemplated illegality is not conclusively thwarted, and
certainly has not been thwarted by a third party or agency.
It is interesting to note, however, that the plaintiff in" the hypothetical
situation is guilty of an illegal conspiracy the moment he makes the agree-
ment, that such illegality is fully executed, and that recovery might be
denied for that reason. This raises the question of whether recovery will
be denied where the illegality contemplated is executory, but where other
illegality is executed. Has plaintiff's opportunity to repent passed? The
62. Lunsford v. First Nat. Bk. of Birmingham, 224 Ala. 679, 141 So. 673 (1932);
Shattuck v. Watson, 53 Ark. 147, 13 S. W. 516 (i89o) ; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS
1 47.
63. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRAcTS § 147.
64. Wasserman v. Sloss, 117 Cal. 425, 49 Pac. 566 (897).
65. Edwards v. Randle, 63 Ark. 318, 320, 38 S. W. 343, 344 (1896).
66. Lunsford v. First Nat. Bk. of Birmingham, 224 Ala. 679, 68i, 141 So. 673, 674
(1932)-
67. As Ch. J. Mansfield pointed out in Aubert v. Walsh, 3 Taunt. 277, 128 Eng.
Rep. R. 11o (Ch. 18io), wherein plaintiff recovered even though his rescission was
actuated by the fact that defendant had been forced into bankruptcy and could not have
paid plaintiff the amount of the wager in any event.
68. Ibid.
69. See note 52 supra.
NOTES
New York Court of Appeals 7 0 affirmed a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
wherein plaintiff requested return of stock loaned to defendant company
to deceive the state insurance department as to the latter's reinsurance lia-
bility, although the stock in fact was used to cover the personal defalcations
of an officer of defendant company and not to deceive authorities as to rein-
surance liability.71 The decision was based simply on the fact that
the loan was for an illegal purpose in which plaintiff participated and there
was no mention of the fact that the illegality contemplated by the plaintiff
continued to be entirely executory. Where the unexpected illegality does
not, as here, preclude the possibility of performance of the real illegal object,
court action would seem to be highly appropriate. Thus, benefits con-
ferred under a Sunday contract to illegally decrease capital stock should
be recovered to discourage an attempt to so decrease the capital stock even
though the illegality of contracting on Sunday has been fully executed.
Caution is directed to the fact that several types of cases which appar-
ently fall within the scope of this discussion are treated separately. Most
important perhaps, at least in number of cases, is the question of whether
or not a gambler may recover his wager. The usual rule appears to be that
the gambler may rescind and recover the amount of his bet as long as the
money remains in the stakeholder's hands,7 2 or, where there is no stake-
holder, until the event upon which the parties were to win or lose has
happened.73
A second class of cases usually treated without much thought of a
locus pcenitentiB permits generally a principal to recover the unexpended
portion of goods or money placed in his agent's hands for use in an im-
proper undertaking.7 4 Analogous to the principal's right to recover which
apparently developed as a rule of agency law, is the rule requiring a
partner to account to his associates regardless of the improper character
of their undertaking, although this latter rule has not been generally
accepted.7 5 Justification for the two rules is stated to be that recovery is
predicated upon the implied promise of the agent or partner, the illegality
being a collateral matter.
7 6
It has been suggested that the rule of locus pcenitentie should be
applied only when the goods sought to be recovered back were necessary to
the execution of the illegality.77 Only when the court removes from the
actor's hands the implement by which the actor is to act wrongfully can
the court be certain that they are acting to prevent the consummation of
7o. Logan v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y., 220 N . Y. 688, 116 N. E. 1O58
(1917).
71. Logan v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y., 161 App. Div. 4o4, 146 N. Y.
Supp. 678 (2d Dep't 1914).
72. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1679, and authority there cited.
73. Ibid.
74. In re Estate v. Lowe, 104 Neb. 147, 175 N. W. 1015 (1920) ; Souhegan Nat.
Bank v. Wallace, 61 N. H. 24 (1881) ; Monongahela Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank of
Carlifornia, Pa., 226 Pa. 270, 75 Atl. 359 (91o). But where the duty to account arises
out of or was a part of the illegal transaction itself, so that to require an accounting
involves the recognition and enforcement of the illegal contract, the courts will give no
aid. Buck v. Albee, 26 Vt. 184 (1854) ; Lemon v. Grosskopf, 22 Wis. 447 (1868).
75. McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639 (1899) ; Harper v. Crenshaw, 82 F. (2d)
845 (App. D. C. 1936) ; Duane v. Merchants Legal Stamp Co., 227 Mass. 466, 116 N. E.
873 (I917), 231 Mass. 113, 12o N. E. 370 (I918), cert. denied, 249 U. S. 613 (1919);
Tucker v. Binenstock, 310 Pa. 254, 165 Atl. 247 (1931).
76. In re Estate of Lowe, 104 Neb. 147, 149, 175 N. W. 1O15, ioi6 (1920) ; Monon-
gahela Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank of California, Pa., 226 Pa. 270, 275, 75 Atl. 359,
361 (igio).
77. HARRIMAN, LAW OF CONTRAcrs (2d ed. i9O) § 24o; ANsoN, CoNTRAcTs (4th
ed. 1887) 200.
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illegality. Thus, if plaintiff were to lend defendant a boat so that the latter
could smuggle contraband goods, rescission and return of the boat would
be permitted; but if plaintiff simply advanced defendant a sum of money
for the job, plaintiff's repentance would be unavailing. This suggestion, as
a workable rule, has never been applied and has been vigorously opposed.73
While the reason is not as strong, it seems that depriving defendant of the
consideration of an unlawful undertaking will tend to avert the violation of
law just as will depriving defendant of the funds or goods furnished as the
means of performance.
Any application whatsoever of the rule of locus pcenitentiae has been
denied specifically in one state7 9 and has either been overlooked or im-
pliedly rejected in several others.80 The New York Court of Appeals
rejected the rule,"' but the decision was reversed on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. 2 New York courts since have repeatedly asserted
that they will not permit recovery on the contract or of benefits conferred
where the transaction relied on is an illegal one, apparently without regard
to the degree of execution or seriousness of the illegality involved, but that
equity may intervene to avoid further illegality by rescinding the unexe-
cuted portion of an illegal bargain when public policy directs such action.'
It seems at least questionable whether mere rescission of the illegal agree-
ment has any beneficial effect since the same result is reached by either
party's refusal to perform, the contract itself (rescinded or not) being
unenforceable.
The rule against enforcing illegal agreements and against requiring a
return of benefits conferred thereunder having been adopted for reasons
of public expediency, it is clear that any exception to the rule should be
founded in some greater public policy. It seems to be generally conceded
that wherever recovery will definitely diminish the possibility of perform-
ance of illegal bargains, the policy against recognizing illegal bargains will
be overbalanced by the policy of preventing the consummation of the spe-
cific illegality contemplated. The rule of locus pcenitentiae should therefore
be employed to permit recovery of benefits conferred in performance of an
illegal agrement only where such an application appears to be more expedi-
ent in protecting the public interest than does application of the rule against
taking cognizance of illegal transactions in civil suits.8 4
J.L.S.
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79. Auditorium Kennel Club v. Atlantic City, I6 N. J. Misc. 354, 199 Atl. go8
(i938). But cf. Cone v. Russell & Mason, 48 N. J. Eq. 208, 21 Atl. 847 (x8gi).
go. Chapman v. Haley, 117 Ky. ioo4, 8o S. W. i9o (904); Smith v. Richmond,
114 Ky. 303, 70 S. W. 846 (1902) ; Bryant v. Wilcox, i37 Mich. 669, IOO N. W. 918
(1904).
8I. Knowlton v. Congress & Empire Spring Co., 57 N. Y. 518 (1874).
82. Spring Co. v. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 49 (1880).
83. Schley v. Andrews, 225 N. Y. iio, 121 N. E. 812 (i919); see DiTomasso v.
Loverro, 25o App. Div. 2o6, 209, 293 N. Y. Supp. 912, 916 (2d Dep't 1937) ; Darling v.
Darling, 241 App. Div. 57, 58, 27o N. Y. Supp. 557, 56o (4th Dep't 1934).
84. See note 4 supra.
